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ABSTRACT China’s sustained high-speed several-decade-long economic growth 
has raised the level of per capita income, but also brought about a serious income 
gap. Taxes and public transfers are main policy governmental tools in the process of 
redistribution. This paper leads a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of taxes and 
transfers on income redistribution using decomposition method and is based on Chi-
na’s Urban Household Survey Data (2002–2009) derived from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. The empirical results reveal that government’s net transfer reduc-
es urban household’s increasing market income inequality, and the improvement ef-
fect increases with time. Taking a closer look, it shows that both tax and transfer play 
positive adjusting roles. Transfer’s contribution is relatively larger, reflected mainly 
in the improvement of horizontal equality, while tax’s effect is mainly reflected in 
vertical equality. On the whole, the combined redistribution effect of personal income 
tax and social insurance expenses from residents to government is positive, and can 
play a role in regulating the income redistribution. Endowment insurance, social re-
lief and unemployment insurance reduce inequality in the transfers of government 
to residents, even though the last two items’ effects are very weak. In contrast, provi-
dent fund expands income gap. The conclusions reached in this paper will refer to 
the refinement of income distribution reform, promotion of tax reform, and improve-
ment of the social security system
KEYWORDS tax revenue and expenditure; income redistribution; vertical equality; 
horizontal equality
HIGHLIGHTS
1. The comparative analysis of tax and transfer impact on income redistribution has 
been done based on the research of urban households in China in 2002–2009
2. Rising positive impact of net transfers from the budget on the reduction of income 
inequality among urban population is demonstrated
3. The impact of transfers on horizontal inequality reduction, and the impact of taxes 
on vertical inequality reduction is established
4. The need to continue the tax reform and improve the social security system in order 
to reduce the inequality in the income of the population is demonstrated
ПЕРЕРАСПРЕДЕЛИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ЭФФЕКТЫ НАЛОГОВ И ТРАНСФЕРТОВ: 
ОПЫТ КИТАЯ
Лиу Байхиу
Китайская академия социальных наук, г. Пекин, Китай
АННОТАЦИЯ Устойчивый и быстрый экономический рост Китая в течение 
последних десятилетий привел не только к повышению уровня доходов на 
душу населения, но также и к серьезному разрыву в доходах отдельных ка-
тегорий граждан. Основными инструментами государственной политики 
перераспределения доходов являются налоги и трансферты. В статье анали-
зируется их влияние на перераспределение доходов. Исследование проводи-
лось с использованием метода декомпозиции на основе данных обследования 
городских домашних хозяйств Китая в 2002–2009 гг., представленных Наци-
ональным бюро статистики Китая. Эмпирические результаты исследования 
указывают на то, что чистые трансферты из бюджета сокращают неравенство 
доходов среди городского населения, и этот положительный эффект со вре-
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Introduction
While raising per capita income lev-
els, China’s sustained high-speed eco-
nomic growth for several decades has also 
brought a serious income gap. Especially 
after 2008, the social contradictions caused 
by income distribution have amplified 
further under the influence of the finan-
cial crisis, which occurred in many areas 
of economy and society, and has become 
one of the key problems in sustainable de-
velopment. The whole society has reached 
a critical stage of breaking up income gap 
and unfair income distribution.
In fact, the Chinese government has 
made great endeavor in exploring the es-
tablishment of policies promoting social 
equity in the past 10 years. At the same 
time, however, it should also be noticed 
that the disputes over distribution ineq-
uity are getting stronger. While continu-
ing to promote the perfection of redistri-
bution system, two questions have to be 
answered. The first is how to evaluate 
the redistribution role of current Chinese 
government’s revenue and expenditure 
system, and the second is how big is a 
role that each distribution instrument has 
played. The answers can not only verify 
the role of Chinese government in adjust-
ing social income distribution and making 
up the defects of the market, but can also 
provide the basis for mutual matching 
and comprehensive development of rel-
evant policies in practice.
Compared with similar works focus-
ing on China, this paper has the follow-
ing contributions. First, it tries to break 
through the barriers of considering redis-
tribution of policies separately, and mea-
sure the effect of a package of policies to-
gether. Second, in order to arrive at a more 
comprehensive and in-depth conclusion, 
it compares the effects of each of the poli-
cies taking interactions among different 
policies into account.
Literature Review
Studies on redistribution effect of gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure starts 
менем возрастает. Подробное изучение данного вопроса показывает, что и 
налоги, и трансферты играют позитивную роль в корректировке неравно-
мерного распределения доходов. Трансферты влияют в основном на сокра-
щение горизонтального неравенства и вносят более значительный вклад в 
корректировку ситуации, чем налоги, которые главным образом способству-
ют сокращению вертикального неравенства. В целом, совместный перерас-
пределительный эффект персонального подоходного налога и взносов на 
социальное страхование носит благоприятный характер и может использо-
ваться для перераспределения доходов. Трансферты резидентам из государ-
ственного бюджета, страхование вкладов, социальная помощь и страхование 
от безработицы также уменьшают неравенство, однако эффект последних 
двух мер очень слабый. Резервный фонд, напротив, увеличивает разрыв в 
доходах. Выводы, сделанные по результатам исследования могут быть ис-
пользованы при дальнейшем реформировании распределения доходов и 
продвижении налоговой реформы, а также в совершенствовании системы со-
циального обеспечения
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА Налоговые поступления и расходы; перераспределение 
доходов; вертикальное равенство; горизонтальное равенство
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. Проведен сравнительный анализ влияния налогов и трансфертов на пере-
распределение доходов на основе данных обследования городских домашних 
хозяйств в Китае за 2002–2009 гг.
2. Выявлено возрастающее положительное влияние чистых трансфертов из 
бюджета на сокращение неравенство доходов среди городского населения
3. Установлено влияние трансфертов на сокращение горизонтального неравен-
ства, а налогов на сокращение вертикального неравенства
4. Показана необходимость продолжения налоговой реформы и совершенство-
вания системы социального обеспечения с целью сокращения разрыва в дохо-
дах населения
Journal of Tax Reform, 2017, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 43–51
45
ISSN 2412-8872
from progressivity of income tax, and can 
be retrieved to R. A. Musgrave and T. Thin 
[1], where income elasticity of tax burden 
or taxable income are used as the index of 
progressivity measure. In the late 1970s, a 
group of scholars constructed a single nu-
merical index based on the Lorenz curve, 
which was used to measure the overall 
progressivity of a tax system [2; 3]. In the 
1980s, schorlars advocated a more detailed 
analysis of the data so that policymakers 
could be well aware of the situations faced 
by various income groups in the distribu-
tion [4]. Since coordinate values on the Lo-
renz curve are based on samples, Lorenz 
advantage test is introduced to determine 
the significance of differences between 
different curves [5].
However, the progressive indica-
tors mentioned above are closely related 
to vertical equity. Since Feldstein intro-
duced the concept of horizontal equity 
in 1976, scholars have tried to break up 
the redistribution effect by decompose-
ing horizontal equity from vertical equity 
and this exploration goes through the 
three phases. The first is APK decomposi-
tion, which mixes horizontal and vertical 
equity by focusing only on relative sort-
ing changes without limiting the income 
groups [6–8]. The second phase is AJL 
decomposition, which decomposes the 
redistribution effect into vertical equity, 
horizontal equity, and reranking effect by 
separating horizontal effect from vertical 
effect [9; 10]. The third phase is the UL 
method, by which the AJL decomposi-
tion method is amended to relax the hy-
pothesis of inter-group and intra-group 
reordering problem [11]. The redistribu-
tion effect can then be completely de-
composed into vertical effect, horizontal 
effect and reordering effect. Based on the 
evolution of the above theoretical model, 
many issues on public revenue and ex-
penditure have been analyzed [12–17].
There is a wide range of polices used 
to regulate income distribution, which 
are often associated with each other. In 
the comprehensive assessment of the set 
of fiscal revenue and expenditure policies 
impact on income distribution, an addi-
tional interaction between the policies 
should be taken into account. In the early 
days it is typical to add different order of 
policies, but the subjective order selec-
tion will affect the result. One solution is 
judging policy contribution by breaking 
down the net budget effect, but it must 
be based on the absence of a reordering 
effect [18]. In order to correct the devia-
tions of estimated results caused by re-
ordering, Duclos computes the results of 
each possible sort using the sequential 
method, but he still can not give the defi-
nite answer [19]. Urban uses a “micro-ap-
proach” to solve this problem: people are 
grouped by income, and after the exami-
nation of the difference in tax burden and 
transfer payment, an integration between 
groups is achieved [20].
In the existing works about China, 
redistribution effects of important gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure as-
pects are examined, but the representa-
tive empirical articles only decompose 
the differences of Gini coefficients before 
and after taxation based on “effective 
progression”. In terms of government 
expenditure, analyses mainly focus on 
medical and health financing, urban 
subsistence allowances, and so on. Since 
the problems discussed are singular, the 
methods used are MT index decompo-
sition, Theil index decomposition, etc., 
and they can’t achieve a thorough de-
composition of inequality. In general, 
there are no results in literature on the 
overall inspection of the redistribution 
effect of China’s fiscal revenue and ex-
penditure policies.
Research Method
Decomposition of Redistribution 
Effect of Tax and Transfer. The rela-
tionship between the progressive index 
K  and the redistribution effect V can be 
expressed as1,
,
1
.
1
T T
E E
t
V K
t
e
V K
e
=
−
=
+  
(1)
1 Due to the limited space, the specific proof 
of the process is omitted here, which interested 
readers can obtain from the author.
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In which 
andT E
X X
t eµ µ
µ µ
= =
are the average transfer rate of household 
transfer expenditure and income respec-
tively.
Same as the derivation of (1), the net 
income redistribution effect can be writ-
ten as,
.
1 1N T E
t e
V K K
e t e t
= +
+ − + −       
(2)
In which
and
1 1
t e
e t e t+ − + −
represent the contribution of taxation and 
transfer payments to redistribution re-
spectively. Through (2), we can measure 
the different degrees of importance of 
taxation and transfer in income redistri-
bution.
Merging (1) and (2), the following 
equation can be get,
1 1
.
1 1N T E
t eV V V
e t e t
− +
= +
+ − + −       
(3)
Therefore, VN can be calculated by VT 
and VE, but not their weighted average. 
The Redistributive Effect of Single 
Policy. In a separate measure of the role of 
a policy, the redistribution effect consists 
of vertical redistribution and reordering 
effects. For each tax and transfer policy, it 
can be expressed as,
( ) .
1
K K
K N N
gRE P G C V R
g
= − − = −
−  
(4)
J. R. Aronson, P. Johnson and 
P. J. Lambert (1994) improve equation (4), 
and decompose the redistribution effect 
into horizontal fairness, vertical fairness 
and sorting effect [10].
.AJL AJL AJLRE V H R= − −  (5)
This method needs to break down the 
data into several equal income groups, 
and therefore does not take into account 
the reordering effect within group RWG 
and between groups RBG. In view of this, 
I. Urban, P. J. Lambert (2008) [11], I. Urban 
(2010) [20] proposed UL decomposition 
method on the basis of improving the de-
composition method in (5).
.UL UL KRE V H R= − −  (6)
The meaning of RK in (6) is the same as 
in (4). Besides, 
,UL AJL BGV V R= +
,UL AJL WGH V R= −
.K AJL BG WGR R R R= + +
Data Description and Processing
Data description. The data used in 
this paper is derived from the National 
Bureau of Urban Household Survey 
(UHS) (2002–2009) of the National Bu-
reau of Statistics of China. This survey 
covers all provinces in China, using strat-
ified sampling to obtain samples, and has 
the longest investigation period and larg-
est sample compared to other domestic 
data. All samples are rotated by 1/3 each 
year and have a detailed record of the 
household membership composition and 
the amount of income and expenditure. 
Table 1 lists the basic statistics of main 
variables2. 
Data Processing. After the series of 
indicators comparison and data integra-
tion, the correspondence between rev-
enue and expenditure indicators and in-
formation in the database are established. 
The Adult Equivalent Scale factor is also 
used in this paper to adjust the size of 
family. If the number of adult and child 
in a family are NA and NC respectively, 
this family includes ( )A CZ N N
θ
= + φ  
equivalent families, in which ϕ is con-
sumer demand of child relative to adult, 
and θ is family economies of scale. The 
formula assumes that adults and children 
in the family are the only non-income fac-
tors that affect demand. This paper uses 
the method of J. R. Aronson, P. Johnson 
and P. J. Lambert [9], A. Wagstaff et al. 
[14] to set the relationship between pa-
rameters as 
1
.
2
φ = θ =
2 Due to space limitation, detailed data on 
tax and transfer are omitted. Readers who are 
interested in this can obtain from the author.
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Empirical Results
Redistribution Effects of Govern-
ment Net Income and Expenditure and 
it’s Decomposition. The measurement 
of the redistribution effect of fiscal net 
income and expenditure can compre-
hensively reflect the impact of current 
government revenue and expenditure 
policies on income distribution, and can 
facilitate the formation of the overall 
evaluation. On the basis of total effect 
calculating, this paper decomposes it into 
two aspects: the influence of taxation and 
the effect of transfer payment. The main 
results are shown in Table 2. The follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn from the 
empirical results.
First, the Gini coefficient of urban resi-
dents’ market income rose from 0.3888 in 
2002 to 0.4207 in 2009, which showed an 
Table 1
Statistical description of key indicators
Year Sample 
size
Market incme Tax Transfer Net income
mean variance mean variance mean variance mean variance
2002 12 813 15 053.5 8 662.8 856.7 1 244.9 3 124.1 5 361.3 14 297.1 8 093.6
2003 14 288 15 745.9 9 864.2 1 037.7 1 556.1 3 102.7 5 426.1 14 827.8 9 077.9
2004 15 505 18 448.1 11 612.4 1 337.0 1 964.7 3 724.7 6 497.1 17 242.8 10 665.6
2005 16 648 20 384.6 12 834.6 1 550.7 2 282.5 4 330.5 7 265.6 18 985.0 11 804.5
2006 16 831 22 904.7 14 214.2 1 847.4 2 670.3 4 765.7 7 824.2 21 244.8 12 991.1
2007 16 856 25 765.0 15 363.8 2 119.0 2 964.8 5 461.8 9 071.0 23 732.6 13 998.3
2008 16 856 27 315.6 17 238.1 2 190.0 3 243.7 5 762.3 9 638.7 25 336.6 15 748.1
2009 16 856 31 351.0 18 804.8 2 974.8 3 899.6 6 865.8 11 349.2 28 631.3 17 024.1
Table 2 
Redistribution Effects of Government Net Income and Expenditure  
and it’s Decomposition
Indicators 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Net Income(N = T – B)
Gini Coefficient before 
Transfer
0.3888 0.4021 0.4028 0.4136 0.4116 0.4072 0.4255 0.4207
Gini Coefficient after 
Transfer
0.3041 0.3224 0.3192 0.3207 0.3200 0.3151 0.3235 0.3146
Redistribution Effect 0.0846 0.0797 0.0836 0.0930 0.0916 0.0921 0.1020 0.1061
% 21.77 19.82 20.75 22.48 22.25 22.62 23.98 25.22
Average Tax Rate –0.1516 –0.1298 –0.1194 –0.1339 –0.1182 –0.1160 –0.1303 –0.1319
Contribution of Govern-
ment Net Expenditure VN
0.1542 0.1423 0.1493 0.1623 0.1555 0.1619 0.1761 0.1896
Contribution of Tax 0.0040 0.0048 0.0059 0.0069 0.0074 0.0061 0.0055 0.0043
% 2.62 3.35 3.98 4.25 4.78 3.77 3.12 2.28
Contribution of Govern-
ment Subsidy
0.1501 0.1375 0.1433 0.1554 0.1481 0.1558 0.1706 0.1853
% 97.38 96.65 96.02 95.75 95.22 96.23 96.88 97.72
Vertical Equality 0.1464 0.1332 0.1379 0.1508 0.1488 0.1548 0.1543 0.1839
% 173.02 167.09 164.96 162.20 162.47 168.07 151.20 173.30
Horizontal Equality –0.0078 –0.0091 –0.0114 –0.0115 –0.0067 –0.0070 –0.0218 –0.0057
% –9.17 –11.39 –13.69 –12.37 –7.32 –7.64 –21.39 –5.38
Reordering Effect 0.0695 0.0625 0.0657 0.0693 0.0639 0.0697 0.0741 0.0835
% 82.18 78.48 78.64 74.57 69.79 75.70 72.59 78.68
Tax T
Gini Coefficient before 
Transfer
0.3888 0.4021 0.4028 0.4136 0.4116 0.4072 0.4255 0.4207
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upward trend. This suggests that the de-
gree of income inequality determined by 
the market is gradually widening.
Second, about 11.67 % of the market 
income is used for tax in 2009, and trans-
fer equivalent to 24.86 % of market in-
come. The government’s net income and 
expenditure are significantly narrowing 
the income gap each year. By 2009, the 
government reduces 25.22 % of the in-
come gap. The Gini coefficient after net 
transfer is lower than the national over-
all level, indicating that the urban pop-
ulation income inequality is relatively 
weak.
Third, the decomposition of the re-
distribution effect of government net 
revenue and expenditure shows that 
vertical equity improvement plays the 
main role, accounting for more than 
150 %. Most of the improvements in 
horizontal and vertical equity of the net 
income and expenditure are from the 
role of transfer, and the contribution 
is above 95 %. In 2004, the proportion 
reached 97.72 %.
Fourth, the progressivity of the total 
taxation increases and then decreases, 
which affects the tax income redistribu-
tion effect. The decomposition shows 
that vertical equity plays the main role, 
accounting for more than 150% each 
year. Relatively speaking, the progres-
sivity of transfer is increasing, mainly 
reflected in the promotion of horizontal 
equity.
Indicators 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Gini Coefficient after 
Transfer
0.3856 0.3986 0.3983 0.4081 0.4058 0.4032 0.4222 0.4191
Redistribution Effect 0.0031 0.0035 0.0045 0.0055 0.0058 0.0040 0.0033 0.0016
% 0.81 0.88 1.12 1.33 1.42 0.98 0.77 0.39
Average Tax Rate 0.0685 0.0778 0.0852 0.0928 0.0972 0.1009 0.0984 0.1167
k index of tax PK 0.0678 0.0692 0.0780 0.0843 0.0855 0.0675 0.0631 0.0419
Contribution of total 
expenditure VK
0.0050 0.0058 0.0073 0.0086 0.0092 0.0076 0.0069 0.0055
Vertical Equality VUL 0.0067 0.0083 0.0093 0.0091 0.0104 0.0086 0.0070 0.0072
% 213.60 235.60 205.72 165.00 177.64 215.67 214.84 440.80
Horizontal Equality HUL 0.0017 0.0025 0.0020 0.0005 0.0012 0.0010 0.0001 0.0017
% 54.30 69.72 44.53 8.67 20.19 25.64 3.44 102.14
Reordering Effect RK 0.0019 0.0023 0.0028 0.0031 0.0034 0.0036 0.0036 0.0039
% 59.30 65.88 61.20 56.32 57.45 90.03 111.41 238.66
Transfer B
Gini Coefficient before 
Transfer
0.3888 0.4021 0.4028 0.4136 0.4116 0.4072 0.4207 0.4207
Gini Coefficient after 
Transfer
0.3080 0.3270 0.3248 0.3277 0.3277 0.3205 0.3187 0.3187
Redistribution Effect 0.0808 0.0751 0.0780 0.0859 0.0839 0.0868 0.1021 0.1021
% 20.78 18.68 19.35 20.77 20.38 21.31 24.26 24.26
Average Tax Rate 0.2201 0.2075 0.2046 0.2267 0.2153 0.2169 0.2486 0.2486
k index of transfer 0.5021 0.4911 0.5179 0.4901 0.4964 0.5158 0.5078 0.5078
Contribution of transfer 0.1417 0.1286 0.1332 0.1436 0.1362 0.1429 0.1680 0.1680
Vertical Equality 0.0072 0.0200 0.0158 0.0202 0.0167 0.0095 0.0059 0.0059
% 3.46 10.69 8.14 9.73 8.18 4.47 2.43 2.43
Horizontal Equity –0.1345 –0.1087 –0.1175 –0.1234 –0.1196 –0.1333 –0.1621 –0.1621
% –166.54 –144.67 –150.67 –143.68 –142.52 –153.68 –158.80 –158.80
Reordering Effect 0.0609 0.0535 0.0553 0.0577 0.0523 0.0561 0.0659 0.0659
% 75.44 71.26 70.89 67.20 62.39 64.65 64.58 64.58
End of the table 2
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Redistribution Effects of Different 
Government Incomes and Expenditures
Expenditures from Residents to 
Government. In terms of residents’ 
spending to government, income tax and 
four social security projects were selected 
(pension expenditure, medical insurance 
expenditure, unemployment insurance, 
provident fund). The results show that 
the redistribution effect of individual 
pension expenditure is negative, and the 
negative impact in 2006 is exacerbated, 
which may be due to the changes in the 
way and proportion of individual ac-
counts payment implemented on Janu-
ary 1 of that year3. The contribution of 
personal medical insurance expenditure 
to income redistribution is negative, and 
there is an increasing trend every year. 
This shows that the setting of premium 
payment is widening the income gap to 
a certain extent, and is not conducive to 
improving the income distribution in the 
two most important elements of the so-
cial insurance system. The contribution 
of personal income tax and provident 
fund to redistribution is positive, and the 
role is expanding over time. The impact 
of unemployment insurance on income 
redistribution is relatively weak.
On the whole, the combined redistri-
bution effect of personal income tax and 
social insurance expenses from residents 
to government is positive, and can play a 
role in regulating the income redistribu-
tion. From the changing trend, the role 
of household expenditure in improving 
income distribution is first expanded and 
then narrowed, with a turning point at the 
year 2006.
Transfers from Government to Resi-
dents. The role of pension in adjusting 
income distribution is relatively stronger 
in the transfers from government to resi-
dents. Although the main function of un-
employment insurance, social relief and 
other projects is to adjust distribution and 
help low-income people, their role is very 
3 From January 1, 2006, the size of personal 
accounts was adjusted to 8 % of wage from 11 %, 
all formed by personal payment, and unit pay-
ment is no longer included in the personal ac-
count.
weak, which might be because few urban 
workers can satisfy the standards of social 
relief, and the usage of unemployment 
insurance is limited by many restrictions, 
such as unemployment registration and 
payment for at least one year.
The redistribution function of pen-
sion basically maintains a rising tendency. 
Social relief shows a clear jump in 2008, 
which is related to the obvious increase 
of the minimum living guarantee expen-
diture and frequent natural disasters. But 
the role of unemployment insurance con-
tinues to decline, the provident fund’s ad-
justment in most years has been negative. 
This reflects that the functions of a series 
of fiscal policies have not been fully imple-
mented yet, and there is still much room 
for adjustment.
Conclusions
The results of this paper reveal that the 
role of government net transfer in income 
distribution is gradually increasing facing 
the widening income gap among urban 
residents. In 2009, 25.22 % of the income 
gap reduced, which is mainly reflected in 
vertical equity adjustment. Although both 
transfers and taxes play a positive role, 
their contributions present great dispari-
ties. Transfers take up more than 95 % of 
the whole effects. In the expenditure of 
residents to government, the redistribu-
tion effects of pension and medical insur-
ance expenses are negative. However, the 
redistribution effects of personal income 
tax and provident fund are obvious., Only 
the pension has a clear redistribution ef-
fect in the transfers of government to the 
residents. Based on the above conclusions, 
China’s redistribution policies still have 
adjustment spaces in the following areas.
First, the redistribution function of 
tax system needs to be strengthened fur-
ther. On the one hand, as one of the main 
tools of regulating income distribution, 
personal income tax’s tax base should 
gradually shift from “income’ to ‘wealth”. 
Only when the comprehensive income 
tax system is built can we touch the core 
of income distribution and strengthen the 
adjustment. Of course, this needs to be es-
tablished on the basis of tax collection and 
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management improvement. On the other 
hand, one should explore the income dis-
tribution function of value-added tax, cor-
porate income tax, property tax and other 
major taxes, and implement social justice 
into tax reform standards.
Second, the primary feature of social 
insurance is mutual aid, and different 
policies can play a positive or negative 
redistribution effect in terms of premium 
raising and compensation. Progressive 
payment ratio based on income or wealth 
can be developed to improve social insur-
ance fund raising system and create great-
er space for the improvement of social in-
surance redistribution function.
Finally, transfer methods such as so-
cial relief, unemployment insurance, have 
clear redistribution functions. The orien-
tation to the ‘bottom of social protecting 
net’ should be strengthened to adjust the 
structure and improve the aspects.
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